

SECURITY INFORMATION

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6 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation between [] [] []

1. [] came to my office at my request on 30 January, and we discussed the following points:

a. [] reported that [] was very much disturbed over the recent American leaflet flight over Albania. This had been originally scheduled as a British flight and [] had a great deal of trouble due to a shortage of planes which necessitated his going to top Air Ministry officials in order to secure an aircraft for this flight. After finally securing the aircraft he was advised that the Americans were going to make this flight, a point which came up only when he requested leaflets from OPC people in Athens and was told that none were available as they were scheduled to be dropped by an OPC flight within a few days.

Not true

I explained that our people had in turn been most disturbed because for weeks they had endeavored to ascertain if in fact the British were going to run their scheduled flight and meet the commitment we felt they had made to us. Our people could get no confirmation from [] that the British were going to make the flight, and in fact had received a cable stating no leaflet flights were planned. Finally as some action became quite necessary and we seemed unable to extract an answer from SS, we went ahead and ran the flight ourselves. There was great concern over this as we felt that [] was not living up to the agreements made at the Rome Meeting. Since that time I have realized that perhaps []'s hands were tied because of the changes in VALUABLE, and the uncertain state of affairs in regard to F.O. policy.

[] stated further that regardless of the circumstances, [] felt that the British should have been advised of our pending flight. He expressed concern over the apparent lack of adequate liaison in the field. In connection with this he inquired as to what sort of a chap [] was and why had he not been able to find out from our people that we were planning our own flight. I replied that [] was a very capable person, had done everything he could in the matter, but apparently was not kept properly advised by London and hence prevented from functioning properly as liaison officer with our field personnel.

I asked [] about a recent cable we had received from the field advising that the British were not planning to make any leaflet drops. [] explained that this was due to the fact that we had been unable to supply them with any leaflets for the flight in question.

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SECRET

I stated further

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

I stated further that the first corrective step might be for both [] and myself to indicate to the field that the trouble had developed due to lack of coordination in Athens whereby we did not know of the British intentions to run their scheduled flight and therefore scheduled our own, and the British lack of knowledge that we were going to do this. I added that I felt that [] had placed [] in a very difficult position by not keeping him advised of his efforts.

b. I pointed out that there appeared to be some deviation in [] latest plans for VALUABLE for 1952 ~~and~~ ^{from} the agreements laid down at the Rome Meeting. The first was that [] latest paper said the British planned to make only 2 or 3 leaflet drops during 1952. The second point was that the British would run only specific intelligence missions when I had understood from the Rome Meeting that a certain number of coun de main missions would be undertaken for psychological effect. [] had no answer on this and asked if I wished him to take this up with London. I said that I didn't feel this would be necessary as the deviations were probably caused by the Foreign Office and hence beyond [] control. I stated further that it was obvious that [] had had to cut down on his original plans, and that I felt that there was no reason why we should curtail our plans merely because the British had had to limit their's.

c. [] then passed me a letter from [] I told [] that I was very glad to read this letter as it confirmed some feelings I had that there was a misunderstanding over "operational disengagement." It was evident to me that [] felt that there had been some change in stated policy, and I stressed the fact that the principle of operational disengagement remained as it always had, and there had been no change. We then discussed [] views as expressed in the letter over the exchange of operational intelligence and the British view that the exchange was not equal. I explained to [] that this view was possibly quite correct, but that we had authority to release operational intelligence only for the OPC activities in Albania and not for OSO, whereas the British, having no analogous division in their intelligence system, could give us all their Albanian intelligence. I assured [] that we gave them absolutely all intelligence that we had gathered in connection with FIEND operations, and that we were quite in agreement with the policy of "we give you only what you give us." In the future, I added, the situation would become much better as OPC and OSO became more firmly merged.

d. We next discussed liaison in the field. [] thought that some of the trouble was obviously caused by the great number of channels, a thing with which I disagreed. We both agreed that all liaison should take place in the field and if any difficulties arose, then these should be passed to London and Washington for solution. I told [] that we had instructed [] to keep the British fully advised of all of our plans and actions and to maintain adequate and detailed liaison in Athens.

SECRET

e. []

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

e. [] then discussed the British desire to change [] because of certain operational difficulties he was experiencing in regard to office space, secretarial help, etc. They wished to put him [] I explained that we were not pleased with this news and felt [] most undesirable. In response to [] query as to whether we felt this undesirable because of [] reasons or political reasons, I replied that we felt the political implications would be most undesirable. It would have a bad effect on the Albanians if on one hand they dealt with an official of the Embassy and on the other hand with an American liaison man [] said that the decision had not been finalized and asked how strongly I felt on the matter. I replied that I should like to see the matter delayed for a month, and that if it is decided to allow the liaison people to be official, we should agree to do this jointly and at the same time. Otherwise our representative would be placed in a very difficult position. [] said that the Italian police were fully aware of who their man was, and he was quite sure they were also aware of the identity of our man. [] asked if any OSO people were involved in Rome with the Committee. I replied in the negative. I told [] that OSO is preparing a summary of its activities in Albania for [] information and he should get it within a short period of time.

f. I then told [] that I was disturbed by the amount of talking Pali has done since his meeting with [] and that I felt that [] had told Pali more about 1952 plans than we feel a Committee member should be told. I further stated that I had felt for some time that the BK party enjoys a special position in British eyes, that they had been told more about plans than any other party, and that we felt this was not in accordance with our view that the parties should be treated in an equal manner. This preferred treatment of the BK by the British makes them very cocky and difficult to deal with. [] suggested that perhaps Pali was pretending for prestige purposes that he knew more than he actually did. I stated that perhaps that was so, but the information Pali had was quite accurate. [] felt that much of the difficulty was due to the difference in the basic approach by the British and the Americans to the Committee. The British top national priority is intelligence from within Russia and they look to the BK for recruiting assistance and material and pay them accordingly for their services. This payment for services may have been interpreted as political financial support by us.

g. I then told [] that the BK newspaper carried an anti-Greek article recently which incensed the Greeks to the point where they had intentions of protesting to the Italians for allowing such an article to be published on Italian soil. I asked [] if the British could not do something about this sort of

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SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

thing, give the BK a sharp rap, as the political implications were very bad since the BK is a member of the NCFA, and a very important member at that, and thus this incident reflected on the whole Committee. [] said he would look into this matter.

[]
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

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